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Charles R. T. O’Kelley* 
INTRODUCTION 
Merrick Dodd is remembered primarily for his role as coprotagonist, 
with Adolf Berle, in the famous Berle–Dodd debate. Dodd’s contribution 
to that debate—For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?1 (the 1932 
Article)—has generally been interpreted as the inspiration for modern 
stakeholder theory. Berle’s contribution has generally been viewed as the 
foundation on which shareholder primacy rests.2 Both of these views have 
been clarified by the nuanced work of Bratton and Wachter.3 Oddly, while 
scholars have devoted a great deal of attention to Berle’s actual life story, 
there is almost no scholarship that sheds light on Merrick Dodd, the 
historical person.4 
In preparing my presentation and intended paper on the Berle–Dodd 
debate for the Tenth Annual Berle Symposium,5 I had not planned to spend 
a great deal of time researching the historical Merrick Dodd. But one thing 
led to another, and I became increasingly uncertain of my understanding 
of Dodd. Thus, in July 2018, rather than hand in my nearly completed 
                                                     
* Professor and Director, Adolf A. Berle, Jr. Center on Corporations, Law and Society. 
 1. Merrick Dodd, For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 
(1932). 
 2. Berle’s contribution to the debate was comprised of two articles: Adolf A. Berle, Jr., 
Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931), and Adolf A. Berle, Jr., For 
Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932). 
 3. William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins, 34 
J. CORP. L. 99 (2008) (see particularly pages 122–35, 144–52). For further explication, see William 
W. Bratton, Adolf Berle: American Corporatist (Feb. 16, 2008), in 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 772 (2019). 
 4. On the historical Berle, see JORDAN A. SCHWARZ, LIBERAL: ADOLF A. BERLE AND THE 
VISION OF AN AMERICAN ERA (1987); NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS, 1918-1971: FROM THE PAPERS OF 
ADOLF A. BERLE (Beatrice Bishop Berle & Travis Beal Jacobs eds., 1973). The best recent work on 
the historical Dodd is by Bratton & Wachter, supra note 3, even though their primary focus was on 
Adolf Berle. 
 5. This paper is part of the printed version of the Tenth Annual Berle Symposium, held in Seattle, 
Washington, on May 17 and 18, 2018: Symposium, Berle X: Berle and His World, 42 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 261 (2019). 
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paper, I made a pilgrimage to Boston and pored through the E. Merrick 
Dodd Papers (the Dodd Papers).6 My focus was on the period up to and 
shortly after 1932. Frustratingly, most of the Dodd material covered the 
period from 1932 to his death in 1951;7 I paid that material somewhat less 
attention. Equally frustrating, Dodd’s correspondence files inexplicably 
were missing materials for the letters A through H. If there had been any 
correspondence between Dodd and Berle that was not in the Berle Papers,8 
I would not find it here. 
Despite these difficulties and deficits, a much more nuanced picture 
of the historical Dodd gradually emerged. The summer passed, my earlier 
intended paper began to morph into several papers (or potentially a book), 
and Dodd moved from the periphery to the center of my research thoughts 
and efforts. More questions popped up, and in November I made a second 
trip to Boston to go through the Dodd Papers (without a time-period 
prejudice), as well as to make side trips to St. Mark’s School, where Dodd 
took his secondary education,9 and to the Harvard Archives to review 
Dodd’s academic records at Harvard College and Harvard Law School.10 
Along the way, I have experienced several “aha!” moments—the 
discovery of a document shedding important new light on who Merrick 
Dodd really was, what made him tick, or explained why he had written 
what he wrote and made the academic choices that he made. Some of these 
“aha!” moments struck me at the time as being the final missing puzzle 
piece. Yet other “aha!” moments followed. Whether my current 
understanding represents a final resting place—the best I can do in 
reconstructing the historical Merrick Dodd—or a waystation to be 
followed by more fundamentally important discoveries, I cannot say. But 
I do know that my initial version of Merrick Dodd, undoubtedly influenced 
by my pro-Berle starting point, now seems a cartoonish strawman, stuffed 
with inaccuracies. 
Thus, I empathize with Charles Elson and Nicholas Goossen and the 
efforts they undertook to accurately depict Dodd in their recent article, 
                                                     
 6. The E. (Edwin) Merrick Dodd Papers are part of the Historical & Special Collection, Harvard 
Law School Library. The files measure 4.59 linear feet and are contained in 11 linear boxes. Boxes 5–
9 contain correspondence files [hereinafter the Harvard Law School Library, Correspondence Files]. 
 7. Indeed, the Harvard University catalog search system, HOLLIS, identifies the Dodd Papers as 
only containing materials from 1932–1951. Fortunately, this is erroneous. Scattered, but important, 
documents exist dating from the fall of 1928, when Dodd began his career on the Harvard Law School 
faculty. 
 8. The Papers of Adolf A. Berle, 1912–1974, are housed at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential 
Library and Museum in Hyde Park, New York. 
 9. Dodd attended St. Mark’s School in Southborough, Massachusetts from fall 1902 to spring 
1906. 
 10. Dodd attended Harvard College from 1906–1910 and Harvard Law School from 1910–1913. 
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Merrick Dodd: The Rise and Fall of Corporate Stakeholder Theory.11 
They, too, made a pilgrimage to Cambridge to explore the Dodd Papers.12 
Unfortunately, their foundational “aha!” moments led to mistaken 
conclusions. 
As the title suggests, Merrick Dodd is central to Elson and Goossen’s 
argument that shareholder primacy trumps corporate stakeholder theory in 
promoting both wealth creation and income security for stakeholders.13 
But the Merrick Dodd they describe is, like the product of my early efforts, 
the grossest of caricatures—a strawman stuffed with inaccuracies. Dodd 
is brought into Elson and Goossen’s story for only one purpose—to show 
that modern stakeholder theory is inherently flawed. To do this, they first 
assert that Merrick Dodd and his father, for whose estate Dodd was then 
acting as trustee, suffered severe financial losses and hardship as a result 
of the stock market crash that began in October 1929 and the ensuing Great 
Depression.14 They then assert: 
Such developments necessarily weighed heavily on Dodd and greatly 
influenced his thinking throughout the era. Perhaps consequentially, 
he identified with “radical”12 academic thinkers, including John 
                                                     
 11. Charles M. Elson & Nicholas J. Goossen, E. Merrick Dodd and the Rise and Fall of 
Corporate Stakeholder Theory, 72 BUS. LAW. 735 (2017). 
 12. Id. at 736 (“We base portions of our commentary on Dodd’s personal papers, previously 
given scant attention in the literature. Based upon review of these papers, we uncovered important 
information about Dodd and his stakeholder theory that significantly impact the efficacy of his 
approach.”). 
 13. Id. at 735 (“The public’s best hope is an active and vital corporate sector, with investors 
continuing to provide the requisite capital to ensure corporate success. The stakeholder approach, 
which diminishes equity value and availability, harms the very group it was designed to protect. We 
all benefit through a robust corporate economy and brighter economic future.”). For a nuanced and 
insightful consideration of the social role played by shareholder primacy, see Marc T. Moore, A 
Necessary Social Evil: The Indispensability of the Shareholder-Value Corporation, 40 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 427 (2017). Moore concludes: 
The somewhat uncomfortable truth for many observers is that, for better or worse, the 
American system of shareholder capitalism, and its pivotal corporate governance principle 
of shareholder primacy, are ultimately products of our own collective (albeit unintentional) 
civic design. And, until academics and policymakers are capable of coordinating their 
respective energies in the direction of somehow alleviating U.S. worker-savers’ significant 
dependence on corporate equity as a source of non-occupational wealth gains, they would 
be well advised to heed Professor Berle’s warning that “[n]othing is accomplished, either 
as a matter of law or of economics, merely by saying that the claim of this group [i.e., 
shareholders] ought not to be ‘emphasized.’” In the meanwhile, the shareholder-oriented 
corporation—despite its many purported evils—is likely to remain a socially indispensable 
phenomenon. To those who rue this prospect, it might be retorted, “better the devil you 
know than the devil you don’t.” 
Id. at 464. For a stakeholder-oriented perspective, written specifically to rebut Elson & Goossen’s 
article, see Michael J. Vargas, In Defense of E. Merrick Dodd: Corporate Social Responsibility in 
Modern Corporate Law and Investment Strategy, 73 Bus. Law. 337 (2018). 
 14. Elson & Goossen, supra note 11, at 737. 
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Maynard Keynes, who had considerable influence on Dodd’s 
perspective. Clearly, Dodd’s 1932 article, which spurred a significant 
movement for corporate social responsibility was, in part, an emotive 
outgrowth of the personal toll wrought by the Great Depression. 
Around the same time, John Maynard Keynes began to develop his 
general theory of economics and employment, which precipitated a 
new governmental approach to economics. Dodd’s promotion of the 
stakeholders at the expense of the shareholders can be seen as, 
perhaps, a related derivation of Keynesian economics, which was in 
the developmental stages in the 1920s. 
. . . . 
We believe Dodd [in his 1932 Article] rejected the reasonable and 
intuitive [shareholder value maximization] approach of the Dodge 
court because of his personal experiences during, and in the wake of, 
the Great Depression. His primary argument for subordinating the 
shareholder’s role in the corporate agenda is seemingly an emotional 
plea to make societal interests the focal point of the corporation.15 
These factual assertions and conclusions are simply wrong. As I 
show in Part I, Dodd did not suffer financially as a result of the stock 
market crash that began in October 1929 or from the ensuing Great 
Depression. Rather, the available evidence indicates that Dodd was 
unusually well-situated after Black Tuesday and throughout the early 
1930s. Nor, as I discuss in Part II, did Dodd’s father likely “lose all his 
money.” Moreover, as I illustrate in Part III, the available evidence does 
not support an inference that John Maynard Keynes strongly or directly 
influenced Dodd’s views in the 1932 Article. In each Part, I fully present 
relevant details drawn from the Dodd Papers so that the reader may assess 
for herself the persuasiveness of my analysis and interpretation. I then 
offer concluding thoughts. 
I. WHAT WAS DODD’S FINANCIAL SITUATION AS  
HE WROTE THE 1932 ARTICLE? 
A. Elson and Goossen’s Claim 
Elson and Goossen claim that “[i]n the wake of the stock market 
crash of 1929, Dodd fell into financial trouble”16 so severe that it impacted 
and at least partially explains Dodd’s views in the 1932 Article. Since 
Dodd’s work on the 1932 Article was substantially completed by the end 
                                                     
 15. Id. at 737–38, 740. 
 16. Id. at 737. 
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of 1931,17 the essence of this claim is that the stock market crash and 
ensuing depression caused Dodd to fall into financial trouble which 
persisted until at least the end of 1931 when he was finishing up the 1932 
Article. 
Elson and Goossen cite only two pieces of evidence for this claim. 
In a letter dated October 29, 1929—a date now known as Black 
Tuesday, due to panic trading and a precipitous drop in the market—
Dodd requested the complete withdrawal of funds from a financial 
institution in Lincoln, Nebraska. The bank initially refused to pay 
and, consequently, set off a chain of correspondence that lasted more 
than a year, ultimately ending with Dodd receiving his money. He 
also quibbled, albeit politely, with HLS Dean Roscoe Pound 
regarding salary.18 
Elson and Goossen do not explain why or how these two episodes 
support the inference that Dodd fell into financial trouble in the aftermath 
of Black Tuesday. Nor do they provide further detail concerning the 
underlying documents on which they rely or any information as to what 
Dodd’s financial situation was before Black Tuesday. I address these 
shortcomings in this Part. 
In subpart B of this Part, I discuss Dodd’s financial situation before 
the events culminating on Black Tuesday. In subpart C, I assess what can 
be learned from Dodd’s attempt, beginning on Black Tuesday, to withdraw 
bank funds. Subpart D analyzes Dodd’s letter to Roscoe Pound seeking a 
salary adjustment. Subpart E then details the evidence that indicates that 
Dodd did not fall into financial trouble in the lead up to his writing of the 
1932 Article, but instead fared very well. 
B. Dodd’s Financial Situation Immediately Before Black Tuesday 
Dodd joined the Harvard Law School faculty in the fall of 1928. His 
contractual agreement called for an annual salary of $6000 for academic 
years 1928–1929 and 1929–1930.19 Thus, immediately before Black 
Tuesday, Dodd made a comfortable living from his teaching position; his 
salary equated to $87,383.72 in 2018 dollars.20 In contrast, in 1929 the 
                                                     
 17. Dodd may have both begun and fully developed the thesis for the 1932 Article during the 
month of December 1931. See Letters from E. Merrick Dodd, Jr. to Professor Frank W. Taussig (Dec. 
8, 1931 & Dec. 22, 1931) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library, Correspondence Files). 
 18. Elson & Goossen, supra note 11, at 737. 
 19. Letter from E. Merrick Dodd, Jr. to Roscoe Pound (Oct. 7, 1930) (on file with the Harvard 
Law School Library, Correspondence Files). 
 20. Calculated using the following formula: [2018 value = 1929 value x (2018 CPI/1929 CPI)], 
with 1929 value being Dodd’s $6,000 salary, and CPI values being 17.2 for 1929 and 250.5 for 2018. 
Formula as specified at Consumer Price Calculator Information, FED. RES. BANK OF MINN., https:// 
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average American worker earned $1,446.28 annually, the equivalent of 
$21,063.55 in 2018 dollars.21 Additionally, Dodd was a participant in the 
Harvard University pension plan.22 Thus, Dodd’s position at Harvard gave 
him security and a comfortable living most Americans would have 
considered enviable. 
Moreover, Dodd had financial means in addition to his salary, a fact 
alluded to in correspondence with his life insurance broker, N.S. Vail, who 
wrote both to remind Dodd of the premium due on Dodd’s existing 
$25,000 life insurance policy and to inquire as to whether Dodd would like 
more coverage.23 
Thanks for the reminder with regard to my payment of premium. 
With regard to the matter of further insurance, my present inclination 
is against it. My present insurance, plus other sources of income 
which are not dependent upon my own labor, is, while not wholly 
ample for all emergencies, sufficient to assure a reasonable degree of 
safety to myself and my wife.24 
And, there is further evidence that Dodd was comfortably situated as 
Black Tuesday approached. First, in the summer of 1928, immediately 
before joining the Harvard faculty, Dodd and his wife, Winifred, spent 
three months honeymooning in Europe, an option only available to those 
with substantial financial flexibility.25 Second, Dodd made a substantial 
second-home real estate purchase shortly after moving to Boston. As 
childhood friend and Harvard Law School faculty colleague Zechariah 
Chafee later recalled, around 1929 and likely before Black Tuesday, Dodd 
                                                     
www.minneapolisfed.org/community/financial-and-economic-education/cpi-calculator-information 
[https://perma.cc/48U7-VS33], and CPI data as specified at Consumer Price Index–, 1913, FED. RES. 
BANK OF MINN., https://www.minneapolisfed.org/community/financial-and-economic-education/cpi-
calculator-information [https://perma.cc/JV68-C9F7]. 
 21. 1929 average worker income determined by using the formula [1929 value = 1998 value x 
1929 CPI/1998 CPI], with 1998 value being $13,076 (the 1929 average household income in 1998 
dollars), 1929 CPI being 17.2 and 1998 CPI being 163. Consumer Price Calculator Information, supra 
note 20; Consumer Price Index, 1913–, supra note 20. 1929 average household income in 1998 dollars 
data, Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality in the United States, 1913–1998, 118 Q.J. 
ECON. 1, 8 tbl.II (2003). 2018 value of 1929 average worker calculated using the formula [2018 value 
= 1929 value x (2018 CPI/1929 CPI)] with 1929 value being the average worker’s 1929 salary—
$1,446.28—and CPI values being 17.2 for 1929 and 250.5 for 2018. Consumer Price Calculator 
Information, supra note 20; Consumer Price Index, 1913–, supra note 20. 
 22. Letter from Merrick Dodd to N.S. Vail (July 12, 1929) (on file with the Harvard Law School 
Library, Correspondence Files, Box 8, File 7). 
 23. Letter from N.S. Vail to Professor Edwin M. Dodd, Jr. (June 29, 1929) (on file with the 
Harvard Law School Library, Correspondence Files). 
 24. Id. (emphasis added). 
 25. Letter from Merrick Dodd to Professor Austin T. Wright (Oct. 1, 1928) (on file with the 
Harvard Law School Library, Correspondence Files). 
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“and his wife wisely used the proceeds of a profitable investment to buy 
an old house in Newcastle, New Hampshire, near Portsmouth. . . . Their 
place extended to the shore, with a lovely view and opportunities for 
sailing and swimming.”26 In all, the property comprised thirty acres.27 
C. Did Dodd’s Attempt to Withdraw a Bank Certificate Beginning on 
Black Tuesday Reflect Personal Financial Distress? 
Elson and Goossen point to Dodd’s effort to withdraw funds 
deposited in The Nebraska Central Building and Loan Association (the 
Association), initiated by a withdrawal request written on Black Tuesday, 
to indicate that the Great Depression put Dodd in personal financial 
distress. Elson and Goossen create the impression that Dodd was in a panic 
to get his money out of the bank and assert that after the bank refused to 
pay, Dodd battled for over a year to get his money.28 
The relevant correspondence creates a very different impression. 
On Tuesday, October 29, 1929, Dodd wrote to the Association as 
follows: “I desire to withdraw the amount paid on my certificate No. 62957 
of stock in your association. I should like to know whether it is necessary 
to indorse the certificate before sending it to you for cancellation.”29 
W. M. Folsom, Secretary of the Association, quickly replied by letter 
dated Monday, November 4, 1929: 
We have your letter of October 29th stating that you wish to withdraw 
your certificate #62957, and we have placed your request on file to 
pay this withdrawal about the first of November [sic] as we are 
requiring the thirty days notice for withdrawal in keeping with our 
by-laws. It will not be necessary for you to endorse your certificate 
but send it in to us for cancellation before the date of withdrawal.30 
Two things are readily apparent from this initial exchange. First, as 
Dodd almost certainly knew, his request for withdrawal was subject both 
to the surrender of his certificate and to a thirty days’ notice requirement. 
                                                     
 26. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Edwin Merrick Dodd, 65 HARV. L. REV. 379, 382 (1952). 
 27. Letter from Merrick Dodd to New Hampshire State Forestry Department (Sept. 15. 1938) 
(on file with the Harvard Law School Library, Correspondence Files). 
 28. See supra text accompanying note 11. 
 29. Letter from E. Merrick Dodd, Jr. to Nebraska Central Building and Loan Association (Oct. 
29, 1929) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library, Correspondence Files, Box 6, Folder 8) (In 
this letter, but not subsequent ones, Dodd misaddressed the Association as “Lincoln, Neb., Building 
and Loan Association.”). 
 30. Letter from W. M. Folsom to E. Merrick Dodd, Jr. (Nov. 4, 1929) (on file with the Harvard 
Law School Library, Correspondence Files). Folsom obviously meant that the withdrawal could occur 
about the first of December, rather than the first of November, as that would be the end of the required 
thirty days’ notice provision. 
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Thus, Dodd could not have expected an immediate influx of cash from his 
withdrawal request, with Monday, December 2, 1929 being the earliest 
payment date he could reasonably expect.31 
Second, contrary to Elson and Goossen’s account, the Association 
did not refuse to honor Dodd’s withdrawal request. Rather, they put it on 
file for payment in very early December of 1929, with the only pre-
condition being that Dodd mail in his certificate before that date. 
However, Dodd did not follow up on his initial withdrawal request. 
He did not mail in his certificate in November or December of 1929. Nor 
did he mail in his certificate in January, February, March, April, or May 
of 1930. This is not the action of someone who desperately needs his 
funds. 
In fact, it was not until Saturday, June 14, 1930 that Dodd again wrote 
to the Association seeking a withdrawal of his deposit. By this point, it 
would certainly have been reasonable for the Association to assume and 
take the position that Dodd’s original withdrawal request had lapsed, and 
that seems to be the position that both Dodd and the Association took.32 
By letter dated June 17, 1930, the Association replied, enclosing “a 
withdrawal notice which you will kindly fill out, sign and return one copy 
to this office.”33 Once again the Association did not refuse to honor Dodd’s 
withdrawal request but noted that the Association had experienced a flood 
of withdrawal requests in March, which was causing a delay of 
approximately four-to-six months in honoring these demands.34 
The Association’s June 17, 1930 letter concluded by asking Dodd to 
consider submitting his withdrawal notice at a later date, after the 
                                                     
 31. If he posted his withdrawal letter on Tuesday, October 29, 1929, Dodd could not have 
expected the bank to be in receipt before Thursday, October 31, making Monday, December 2 the 
earliest possible date on which the thirty days’ notice requirement would be fulfilled. 
 32. The Dodd Papers contain no copy of Dodd’s letter of June 24, 1930. What we know of that 
letter is by virtue of the reference to it made in the Association’s letter to Dodd dated June 17, 1929, 
infra note 33 (“We acknowledge receipt of your letter of June 14th, asking for withdrawal of certificate 
62957.”). 
 33. Letter from Homer K. Burket, the Association’s President, to E. Merrick Dodd, Jr. (June 17, 
1930) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library, Correspondence Files). The Association then 
required a formal withdrawal notice. 
 34. Id. The letter noted in relevant part: 
Since the withdrawal of funds must be paid from the Association’s monthly cash receipts 
it creates an impossible situation for the prompt payment of withdrawals thirty days after 
date of notice, and each withdrawing stockholder must await his or her turn. Therefore it 
has become necessary for the Association to follow the Nebraska statutes which provide 
that withdrawals shall be paid as soon after the thirty days notice as the funds in the treasury 
of the Association will permit. At the present time it is impossible to approximate the time 
required before reaching the payment of your withdrawal, but it will be from four to six 
months. 
Id. 
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Association had caught up with the withdrawal demands: “Stockholders 
must realize that these are unusual times and the Association cannot pay 
out more money than it receives, so we will be very glad to have you 
withhold your application until some later date as we can assure you will 
receive your interest.”35 
Dodd did not reply for several days. Given his emotional ties to 
Lincoln, Nebraska, where he was a member of the University of Nebraska 
law faculty from 1922 to 1928 and where he had met and married his wife, 
Winifred, it is not surprising that he would at least consider the 
Association’s request for abeyance. 
On June 27, 1930, Dodd submitted his withdrawal notice to the 
Association, but noted: 
I have considered the request made in your letter of June 17, that I do 
not ask at this time for the withdrawal of my certificate. I can well 
understand that this is an inconvenient time for you and if it were 
possible for you to make any agreement with your certificate holders 
generally to give you an extension of time, I would be willing to be a 
party to the agreement.36 
As with his initial request for withdrawal made on Black Tuesday, 
but never perfected, nothing about Dodd’s second request for withdrawal 
reflects an urgent need for money. After making the formal withdrawal 
request on June 17, Dodd dutifully waited more than five months before 
again contacting the Association: on December 4, 1930 he politely 
inquired as to the status of his withdrawal.37 
By letter dated December 13, 1930, nearly six months after Dodd had 
perfected his withdrawal request, the Association transmitted a check for 
$1,812.68, representing payment in full of the principal and interest due 
on Certificate #62957.38 This amount equated to slightly more than three 
months of Dodd’s then-salary at Harvard. 
I can understand Elson and Goossen’s excitement at finding the 
initial letter Dodd wrote on October 29, 1929. Surely, they must have 
thought, it is more than a coincidence that Dodd penned this letter on Black 
Tuesday, and that it is beyond reasonable to infer that events on Black 
Tuesday and the days leading up to it caused Dodd to begin the process to 
                                                     
 35. Id. 
 36. Letter from E. Merrick Dodd, Jr. to Nebraska Central Building and Loan Association (June 
27, 1930) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library, Correspondence Files, Box 6, Folder 8). 
 37. Letter from E. Merrick Dodd, Jr. to Nebraska Central Building and Loan Association (Dec. 
4, 1930) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library, Correspondence Files, Box 6, Folder 8). 
 38. Letter from W. M. Folsom, Secretary of the Association, to E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., (Dec. 13, 
1930) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library, Correspondence Files, Box 6, Folder 8). 
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withdraw his money from the Association. I make the same inference, but 
not the subsequent inference that financial difficulty can also be inferred. 
No evidence exists that Dodd held investments that had been acquired on 
margin or with borrowed funds, which, because of the precipitous decline 
in stock prices, would soon expose him to margin calls or similar loan 
repayments that he was having, or would have, difficulty meeting. Nor 
does any evidence exist that Dodd experienced another sudden need for 
cash immediately prior to Black Tuesday. And, as outlined above, both 
Dodd’s halting requests for withdrawal and the fact that his funds could 
not be received for at least thirty days after notice of withdrawal, militate 
against an inference that Dodd’s withdrawal request was motivated by 
immediate financial distress. Instead, the most reasonable inference is that 
Black Tuesday caused Dodd to have some concern for the safety of his 
Nebraska bank deposits (a concern proven prescient by the mini-bank run 
the Association experienced in March of 1930) and that he sought to move 
these funds to a safer location. 
D. Did Dodd’s 1930 Letter to Roscoe Pound Regarding Dodd’s Salary 
Indicate Personal Financial Distress? 
Elson and Goossen assert that we can infer that Dodd experienced 
financial difficulty during the Great Depression from the fact that Dodd 
“quibbled . . . with Harvard Law School Dean Roscoe Pound regarding 
Dodd’s salary.”39 Perhaps in the abstract one could draw a weak inference 
that one who quibbled with their boss over a salary matter might need more 
money because they were in financial difficulty. But more likely 
inferences can be drawn from the mere fact that someone “quibbled” over 
a salary decision, including that the quibbler could have felt that she is 
underpaid, that others similarly situated are being paid more, or that she 
had been promised a raise that is inexplicably being withheld. Indeed, the 
available evidence shows that a reason other than financial difficulty 
explains why Dodd reached out to Dean Roscoe Pound. 
The only evidence Elson and Goossen cite is Dodd’s letter to Pound, 
dated October 7, 1930, which I quote in full: 
Dear Mr. Pound, 
As I told you the other day, I have recently received a notice from the 
Bursar that by vote of the Corporation my salary for the present year 
will be $6,000. This is plainly an error since the agreement between 
us at the time when I came here in 1928, was that my salary should 
be raised to $9,000 after two years. I understand from our recent 
                                                     
 39. Elson & Goossen, supra note 11, at 737. 
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conversation that inasmuch as all $9,000 salaries at the law school 
have been raised to $10,000, the agreement that I should have $9,000 
this year would under existing circumstances, entitle me to $10,000. 
It is my understanding that the error was not made by the Bursar but 
was due to the fact that when the Law School Budget was made out 
your letter containing the agreement with me with regard to salary 
was overlooked. 
I should greatly appreciate it you could find a way to rectify this 
mistake.40 
As the text of the October 7 letter makes clear, Dodd and Pound have 
already discussed the matter and are on the same page. Dodd’s letter serves 
both to sum up what they previously discussed and to provide Pound with 
a document that he can place in his files or attach to any corrective requests 
he will send to the Harvard Corporation as he goes about rectifying what 
is obviously a mistake. Moreover, Dodd’s wording indicates that Pound 
not only will attempt to fix the mistake of not raising Dodd’s salary to the 
previously agreed $9,000 but may also attempt to get the salary increased 
to $10,000, which would put Dodd at the place on the Harvard faculty pay 
scale that Pound had intended when contracting with Dodd. In other 
words, Pound apparently agreed that the original promise of $9,000 should 
be honored and may have agreed that he also wanted to honor its spirit by 
raising Dodd’s salary to $10,000—the level of those previously at the 
$9,000 level. It can hardly be thought that the difference between a $6,000 
and $9,000 salary, a prospective and expected increase of fifty percent, is 
a quibble. Nor can any inference be drawn that Dodd was arguing with 
Pound, either in the original conversation that the October 7 letter 
references or in the letter itself. The only reasonable inference is that Dodd 
brought to Pound’s attention an obvious bureaucratic error and that the two 
of them were united in the intention to have the error cured. 
Importantly, as there is no further correspondence in the Dodd Papers 
concerning this matter, it is reasonable to infer that Dodd received at least 
the promised raise to $9,000 annually, effective in the fall of 1930, and 
may well have been increased to $10,000 annually. Thus, not only does 
Dodd’s interaction with Pound about salary matters support no reasonable 
inference that Dodd was in financial distress, it does support a reasonable 
inference that his financial situation was about to dramatically improve. 
                                                     
 40. Letter from E. Merrick Dodd, Jr. to Roscoe Pound, Dean of Harvard Law School (Oct. 7, 
1930) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library, Correspondence Files). 
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E. Dodd’s Financial Situation as He Wrote the 1932 Article 
In October 1929, Dodd was employing his human capital as a 
Professor at Harvard Law School, earning a salary of $6,000, which 
equates to $87,383.72 in 2018 dollars. As the previous subpart concluded, 
Dodd almost certainly received a raise of $3,000 effective September 
1930, and very possibly an increase of $4,000. Using the more 
conservative figure and assuming that his salary was not increased in the 
fall of 1931, Dodd’s salary at the end of 1931 was $9,000, which equates 
to $148,322.37 in 2018 dollars.41 Viewed from the perspective of 1931 
alone, Dodd’s substantial salary increase from $6,000 to at least $9,000 
occurred as consumer prices were falling, by 2.7 percent in 1930 and 8.9 
percent in 1931. From the perspective of a laborer, then, Dodd was in the 
rare position at the close of 1931, as compared to October 1929, in having 
a secure job at a substantially higher salary while consumer prices were 
collapsing.42 
Dodd, of course, had real estate and capital assets that would have 
declined in value during this period, but there is no evidence that Dodd 
liquidated any assets at the reduced market value which such sales would 
have entailed. Nor is there any evidence that any decline in investment 
income that Dodd may have experienced had an adverse effect on his 
financial situation. Indeed, the most reasonable inference is that Dodd’s 
substantially increased salary more than offset any decline in his 
investment income. 
In support of that inference, we know that Dodd and his wife did not 
sell their second home in New Hampshire, bought in 1929, but instead 
“rebuilt the house with much thought and created an unusually beautiful 
garden [where] they spent many happy summers and week-ends, 
constantly extending delightful hospitality to Faculty couples and other 
friends.”43 The availability and use of cash to substantially rebuild a 
summer home is consistent with increasing—not decreasing—disposable 
income and economic well-being. 
We also know that near the end of 1931 Dodd declined an offer to 
teach at Northwestern Law School during the summer of 1932, giving as 
                                                     
 41. Calculated using the formula [2018 value = 1931 value x (2018 CPI/1931 CPI)], with 1931 
value being Dodd’s $9,000 salary and CPI values being 15.2 for 1929 and 250.5 for 2018. Formula as 
specified at Consumer Price Calculator Information, supra note 20; Consumer Price Index, 1913–, 
supra note 20. 
 42. Consumer Price Index, 1913–, supra note 20. 
 43. Chafee, supra note 25, at 381. 
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his excuse, “I feel I am in danger of going stale from too much teaching.”44 
This is not the decision of one short on money. 
Though it falls later than the end of 1931, Dodd’s comment in his 
1935 Harvard Law School Class Report is instructive: 
At present my principal occupations are seeking to keep ahead of my 
students in Cambridge, and to keep ahead of the insects which devour 
the fruit trees at my summer and weekend home. My favorite 
recreation is trying to make headway in a small knockabout against a 
five-knot tide with a four-knot breeze.45 
We also know that Dodd initiated a sabbatical leave request in 
December 1934 and was granted it for the fall semester of the 1936–1937 
academic year.46 Dodd and his wife used the sabbatical and part of the 
preceding summer to take a trip around the world, which concluded in 
mid-January of 1937. The trip included a one-month tour of India, where 
Dodd made sure to hire a manservant and stay in the finest hotels; the 
Dodds continued on with trips on multiple steam ships, with stops in Java, 
Batavia, Hong Kong, Japan, and Hawaii, before landing in San 
Francisco.47 
These post-1931 indications of Dodd’s financial well-being, if not 
affluence, involved expenditures of time and money made before the death 
of his parents, and constitute strong evidence that Dodd’s economic 
circumstances had continued to be quite favorable despite the post-1931 
buffetings of the Great Depression. Thus, it is beyond reasonable to 
conclude that at the close of 1931, not only was Merrick Dodd not in 
financial distress, he was both better off financially than in October 1929 
and that his financial situation was one of which most Americans would 
have been envious. 
                                                     
 44. Letter from E. Merrick Dodd, Jr. to Leon Green, Dean of Northwestern Law School (Dec. 
17, 1931) (on file with Dodd Papers, Correspondence Files). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Letters from E. Merrick Dodd, Jr. to Roscoe Pound, Dean of Harvard Law School (Dec. 4, 
1934 & Dec. 11, 1935), (on file with the Harvard Law School Library, Correspondence Files). 
 47. Letter from Eustice Seligman to Gabrielle Paquin, Dodd’s secretary, (Sep. 17, 1936) (on file 
with the Harvard Law School Library, Correspondence Files) (“Would you mind letting me know 
where Professor Dodd is spending his sabbatical leave?”); Letter from Gabrielle Paquin to Eustice 
Seligman (Sep. 18, 1936) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library, Correspondence Files) 
(detailing Dodd’s overall itinerary from letter’s date to trip completion); Letter from E. Merrick Dodd, 
Jr. to Indian State Railways (June 5, 1936) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library, 
Correspondence Files) (detailing Dodd’s planned one month stay in India). 
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II. DID DODD’S FATHER LOSE ALL HIS MONEY IN  
THE GREAT DEPRESSION? 
Prior to Black Tuesday, Dodd’s parents would have been considered 
“wealthy Bostonians”48 appropriately included in the Boston Social 
Register.49 Dodd’s father graduated from Harvard College in 1880 and 
thereafter became a successful woolen merchant, starting in Boston in 
1882, moving to Providence, Rhode Island in 1883, and returning to 
Boston in 1905. Consistent with his affluence, Dodd’s father provided the 
finest possible education to his children. Both daughters graduated from 
Bryn Mawr.50 Daughter Katherine earned an M.D. from Johns Hopkins in 
1921 and had a distinguished career as a pediatric physician and educator, 
primarily at Vanderbilt University.51 For his surviving younger son, 
Dexter, who apparently preferred the life of gentleman farmer, Dodd’s 
father provided an apple orchard in New Hampshire. By 1920, at the age 
of sixty-three, Dodd’s father, except for dabbling as a gentleman farmer, 
was essentially in full retirement.52 
Elson and Goossen assert that Dodd’s father “lost all his money” in 
the Great Depression. Their only evidence for this is Dodd’s letter to Dr. 
Henry Jackson, dated May 27, 1931, which reads as follows: 
As father is in a sanitarium your letter to him with regard to the 
Harvard fund has come to me. Father has very little realization of the 
effect of the business depression upon his property, of which I am 
trustee, and as his mental condition is such as to make it impossible 
for him fully to understand business matters I am taking charge of the 
matter of his subscriptions. I know that he would want to give 
something to the Harvard fund and am accordingly sending $5 on his 
behalf. 
As you may perhaps know, father is suffering from arterial sclerosis 
of the brain. In spite of his condition he is almost always so much like 
himself in the late afternoon and evening as to make his condition 
scarcely noticeable. This is particularly likely to be the case where he 
is taken out of himself by such an event as a class dinner. He is 
counting on attending the class dinner this year and the physician in 
                                                     
 48. Dep’t of Pediatrics, Katherine Dodd, M.D. Biography, VAND. UNIV. SCH. OF MED. (July 23, 
2012), https://pediatrics.mc.vanderbilt.edu/interior.php?mid=5607 [https://perma.cc/35VC-CBHQ]. 
 49. Boston, 1909, 36 SOC. REG., no. 5, 1921, at 59; Boston, 1909, 23 SOC. REG., no. 5, 1908, 
at 47.  
 50. HARVARD UNIV., HARVARD COLLEGE, CLASS OF 1880: FORTIETH ANNIVERSARY REPORT, 
REPORT IX-1920, at 61–62 (1920). 
 51. Dep’t of Pediatrics, supra note 48. 
 52. HARVARD UNIV., supra note 50, at 61–62. Dexter’s twin brother, Eugene, died of influenza 
in 1917. Id. at 61. 
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charge of the sanitarium has decided to let him go provided he is as 
well as usual on that date. He enjoyed the class dinner last year and 
his condition has not changed very much since that time. 
I am writing all this to you because I think it important that if he does 
go to the dinner, someone present should understand the situation and 
you as a physician are peculiarly well qualified to understand it.53 
From this letter, and this letter alone, Elson and Goossen surmise that 
Dodd’s father “had lost most of his money due to the Great Depression.”54 
This is pure conjecture. 
As the May 27, 1931 letter notes, despite any damage inflicted to his 
properties by the stock market crash and related business decline, Dodd’s 
father was still being taken care of in a private sanitarium, not in the 
Cambridge home where his wife still resided. There is no indication that 
Dodd’s father’s estate was not paying for this expense or that Dodd was 
contributing to this expense.55 This type of care is indicative of continuing 
wealth, even if that wealth had been reduced in the nineteen months since 
Black Tuesday. Moreover, the fact that Dodd’s father had continued to 
attend his Harvard Annual Class Dinners, and that Dodd was “managing 
his subscriptions” and made a token donation to the Harvard Annual Fund, 
does not support an inference that Dodd’s father’s estate was not still fully 
adequate to provide for the need of Dodd’s father and mother in a style to 
which they had been accustomed. 
We know nothing about the extent or details of Dodd’s father’s 
property holdings immediately prior to the events of late October 1929 
other than that he was considered a wealthy Bostonian. We do not know 
the mix or amount of the investments that he held immediately before the 
stock market crash in October 1929. Were Dodd’s father’s properties 
diversified across stocks, bonds, life insurance annuities, savings accounts, 
and real property, or was he heavily tilted in one direction or another? We 
do not know whether Dodd became trustee of his father’s properties before 
or after Black Tuesday. And we do not know how Dodd’s father, or Dodd 
as his father’s trustee, reacted to various stages of the stock market crash; 
did they sell some or all of the stocks, bonds, and other investments, and 
if so, when? Or did they continue to hold these properties despite falling 
capital values? The effect of the market crash on Dodd’s father’s 
                                                     
 53. Letter from E. Merrick Dodd, Jr. to Dr. Henry Jackson (May 27, 1931) (on file with the 
Harvard Law School Library, Correspondence Files). 
 54. Elson & Goossen, supra note 11, at 737 (citing Dodd’s May 27, 1931 letter to Jackson). 
 55. To the contrary, Dodd’s personal travels and lifestyle in the mid-thirties, see supra text 
accompanying notes 43–47, indicate that he was bearing none of the expense of caring for his parents. 
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properties would have differed greatly depending on the answer to these 
questions, which we unfortunately do not know. 
All we can say with some degree of confidence is that the stock 
market crash and ensuing Great Depression would likely have had a 
negative impact on the capital value of Dodd’s father’s overall investment 
portfolio. To the extent composed of publicly traded stock, the capital loss 
realized would likely have been substantial—the Dow Jones Average on 
October 23, 1929 was 326.51.56 On December 31, 1931, it rested at 
77.90,57 representing a decline from October 23, 1929 of slightly more 
than seventy-five percent. But return on investment via corporate 
dividends did not decline precipitously during this period; on average, 
dividends actually increased during 1930 before falling somewhat below 
1929 levels in 1931.58 So if the estate continued to hold its corporate 
securities, the decline in investment income by the end of 1931 would have 
been much less severe than the decline in capital value. 
We know some of Dodd’s father’s estate was in real property and 
that almost certainly declined in market value.59 Likely some of his 
investments were in life insurance, corporate bonds, and government 
securities. These investments would on average have fared better than 
investments in stock.60 Whatever the magnitude of the capital losses 
realized on paper, there is no reason to assume that Dodd triggered the 
recognition of these losses by sale or other disposition. 
In any event, the decline in value of Dodd’s father’s estate, measured 
from October 1929 to the end of 1931, is misleading in one important 
respect. The senior Dodd had retired by 1920, at the age of sixty-two, a 
wealthy man.61 While there was a post-war depression from 1920–1922, 
the years from 1922 to September 1929 had been exceptionally profitable 
                                                     
 56. MAURY KLEIN, RAINBOWS END: THE CRASH OF 1929 xiv (2001). 
 57. Dow Jones Industrial Average History (DJIA/Dow 30), FED PRIME RATE, http://www. 
fedprimerate.com/dow-jones-industrial-average-history-djia.htm [https://perma.cc/GG4N-XEMW]. 
 58. CQ Press, Dividends and Wages in Periods of Depression, CQ RESEARCHER, https://library. 
cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqresrre1931072000 [https://perma.cc/W9YZ-5CWS]. 
Because dividends were largely maintained “[w]hen the Dow hit a low of 41.22 on July 8, 1932, for 
example, the dividend yield of the overall stock market was close to 14 percent, according to data 
compiled by Robert J. Shiller, the Yale economics professor.” Mark Hulbert, 25 Years to Bounce 
Back? Try 4½, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2009, at BU5. 
 59. HARVARD UNIV., supra note 50, at 61. 
 60. Chris Farrell, Investing During a Great Depression, MARKETPLACE (Sept. 30, 2008, 4:11 
PM), https://www.marketplace.org/2008/09/30/your-money/ask-money/investing-during-great-depre 
ssion [https://perma.cc/6J6U-UPW3]; CQ Press, Life Insurance in the Great Depression, CQ 
RESEARCHER, https://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqresrre1933051900 [https 
://perma.cc/4N75-CPUP]. 
 61. Dep’t of Pediatrics, supra note 48; HARVARD UNIV., supra note 50, at 50. 
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for investors, particularly in the stock market. On December 31, 1920, the 
Dow Jones rested at 71.95; on December 31, 1931, it ended at 77.90.62 
While Dodd’s estate had undoubtedly grown significantly in paper 
value during 1920s, its value at year end 1931 was probably similar to its 
value in 1920. He had been a wealthy man then, and he was likely still a 
wealthy man as 1932 dawned. 
III. DID DODD WRITE THE 1932 ARTICLE UNDER THE INFLUENCE  
OF JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES? 
Elson and Goossen conclude that Dodd wrote his 1932 Article under 
the sway of John Maynard Keynes’s views, as primarily expressed in 
Keynes’s 1926 pamphlet, The End of Laissez-Faire. Their evidence for 
this is beyond thin. They argue that John Maynard Keynes “had 
considerable influence on Dodd’s perspective”63 and his views expressed 
in the 1932 Article.64 To support this inference, Elson and Goossen note 
that in 1938, Dodd included Johan Maynard Keynes’s seminal 1936 book, 
The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, on a list of 
recommended book purchases for the Harvard Law Library.65 Inclusion of 
a 1936 book on a 1938 list of recommended library purchases is slim 
evidence of what Dodd knew about Keynes and his work in 1932. 
There is, however, a more telling document in the Dodd Papers—
Dodd’s book review of The General Theory of Employment, Interest and 
Money.66 In that review, Dodd makes the following revealing admission: 
This book is addressed to the economist rather than to the general 
reader and much of it is extremely difficult for the layman to 
understand, particularly on a hasty reading which is all that I have 
given it. . . . So far as I can make out, it is Keynes’ theory that the 
chief cause of . . . unemployment is that savings do not result in new 
                                                     
 62. Dow Jones Industrial Average History (DJIA/Dow 30), supra note 57. 
 63. Elson & Goossen, supra note 11, at 737–38. 
 64. Id. at 744–45. 
 65. Id. at 744; Memorandum from E. Merrick Dodd, Jr. to Mr. James, Harvard Law Sch. Library 
(Dec. 14, 1938) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library, Correspondence Files). 
 66. The manuscript for Dodd’s review of Keynes’s The General Theory of Employment, Interest 
and Money, is contained in Dodd’s Papers, Manuscript Files, in the file for the names that begin in the 
range K through Ke. The manuscript is typed, double-space, and nine typed lines more than three 
pages in length. My search of the Index of Legal Periodicals and the Book Review Digest did not 
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those digests. 
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investment in instruments of production to anything like the same 
extent as the classical economist assumed.67 
From this remarkably candid acknowledgment, we know that Dodd 
believed himself a layman when it came to economics. We can infer from 
this, and his use of the modifying clause, “as far as I can make out,” that 
he did not pretend to possess the economic grounding needed to fully 
appreciate Keynes’s work. Importantly, in the book review Dodd shows 
no familiarity either with Keynes’s earlier work or with the work of any 
other contemporary economists. His only foil for understanding Keynes 
appears to be a general understanding of classical economics.68 Thus, from 
the two direct references to Keynes’s work found in the Dodd Papers, the 
only reasonable inference is that Dodd was not under the sway of Keynes 
in 1936, much less in 1932. 
However, Elson and Goossen also claim to see similarities between 
the 1932 Article and views expressed by Keynes in his 1926 pamphlet. 
They first summarize the views of Keynes in question: 
In his legendary 1928 [sic] essay, The End of Laissez Faire, Keynes 
spoke of the “sociali[z]ed” large public corporation, where in extreme 
examples, the rights of the shareholders, “in excess of their 
conventional dividend, have already sunk to the neighborhood of 
zero.” In that work, Keynes expressively de-emphasized the role of 
the corporation as a protective agent for the investor, but suggested 
instead that it had become an integral piece of the social fabric.69 
They then assert: 
Dodd repeated this theme in his 1932 article, where he cleverly 
critiqued the prevailing corporate theory: 
Business—which is the economic organization of society—
is private property only in a qualified sense, and society may 
properly demand that it be carried on in such a way as to 
safeguard the interests of those who deal with it either as 
employees or consumers even if the property rights of its 
owners are thereby curtailed.70 
However, this totally misrepresents the cited passage, which was part 
of Dodd’s prediction that the Lochner-era majority, and its striking down 
of state legislation seeking to regulate industry in the public interest, could 
                                                     
 67. Id. (emphasis added). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Elson & Goossen, supra note 11, at 738. John Maynard Keynes, The End of Laissez-Faire, 
was actually first published as a pamphlet by Hogarth Press in 1926. 
 70. Elson & Goossen, supra note 11, at 738 (citing Dodd, supra note 1, at 1162). 
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not long survive. Central to the Lochner-era doctrine was the division of 
business corporations into two sharply distinct types—public and 
private—the former subject to substantial regulation in the public interest 
and the latter protected from much regulation by the due process clause.71 
As Dodd noted, “[t]here is no doubt that property employed in a business 
now classified as a public utility is private property only in a qualified 
sense.” with railroads, for example, being subject to regulation of its rates, 
services, labor relations, and issuance of stocks and other securities.72 
Dodd then predicted that the sharp distinction between public and private 
business corporations was likely coming to an end and “that the law is 
approaching a point of view that regards all business as affected with a 
public interest.”73 The passage Elson and Goossen cite is, then, but Dodd’s 
view of the consequence logically flowing from a decision to view all 
business corporations as having public obligations, and the sources cited 
in his analysis and argument are entirely drawn from legal cases and the 
writings of legal scholars. 
Finally, and more generally, Elson and Goossen see Dodd’s 1932 
Article as consistent with, and a reflection of, views they attribute to 
Keynes: 
Keynes viewed management as having a greater vested interest in the 
company than the shareholders, and he believed that shareholders did 
not have the necessary knowledge to understand the corporation’s 
internal workings. He hoped that this separation of ownership from 
control would free management from a sole obligation to the 
shareholders, so management could divert profits and human capital 
to societal issues. Keynes thought that a proper return warranted 
rewarding human capital and viewed the income received from an 
equity interest as parasitic because the investor made no continuing 
sacrifice to benefit the corporation. He argued that the investor 
eventually became functionless.74 
But the 1932 Article contains no similar analysis of the corporation 
and certainly no characterization of shareholder returns as “parasitic.” 
Rather, Dodd merely advocated that fiduciary duty should not be 
interpreted so strictly as to prevent society from observing the results of 
an experiment: Would allowing corporate managers to voluntarily assume 
social responsibility be a workable and socially advantageous system? 
                                                     
 71. Dodd, supra note 1; Walton H. Hamilton, Affectation With Public Interest, 39 YALE L.J. 
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It may well be that any substantial assumption of social responsibility 
by incorporated business through voluntary action on the part of its 
managers can not [sic] reasonably be expected. Experience may 
indicate that corporate managers are so closely identified with profit-
seeking capital that we must look to other agencies to safeguard the 
other interests involved, or that the competition of the socially 
irresponsible makes it impracticable for the more public-spirited 
managers to act as they would like to do, or that to expect managers 
to conduct an institution for the combined benefit of classes whose 
interests are largely conflicting is to impose upon them an impossible 
task and to endow them with dangerous powers. The question with 
which this article is concerned is not whether the voluntary 
acceptance of social responsibility by corporate managers is 
workable, but whether experiments in that direction run counter to 
fundamental principles of the law of business corporations.75 
Keynes’s views undoubtedly were swirling in the air breathed in late 
1931 by thought leaders among American economists. But Dodd and 
Elson have not connected any dots directly between Keynes’s ideas and 
the 1932 Article. The most reasonable inference from the available record 
is that Dodd was not a student of, or under the influence of, Keynes’s ideas 
as of the writing of the 1932 Article. 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
If Dodd’s views in the 1932 Article cannot be traced to financial 
trauma experience by Dodd or his father in the Great Depression, or to the 
influence of Keynes, from whence did his views derive? The obvious place 
to look, of course, is the 1932 Article, and there we see Dodd telling us 
that he was influenced by the mainstream ideas swirling in America in late 
1931—the business commonwealth views of Owen Young and Gerard 
Swope,76 and the pragmatic and pro-business leader work of Harvard 
Business School Dean Wallace Donham in Business Adrift.77 
                                                     
 75. Dodd, supra note 1, at 1162. 
 76. Id. at 1153–58. On Owen Young and Gerard Swope and business commonwealth 
corporatists, see Bratton & Wachter, supra note 3, at 123–28. 
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Id. (citing DONHAM, supra note 77, at 38). 
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The Dodd Papers, however, provide scholars with an opportunity to 
do more in understanding Dodd than simply trace the sources he cites to 
their logical endpoints. As Elson and Goossen note, “Dodd’s papers 
provide modern legal and finance scholars, as well as business lawyers, 
with much to consider as they wrestle with the historic and continuing 
battle between shareholder and stakeholder primacy.”78 Indeed, my 
research convinces me that the Dodd Papers offer a uniquely valuable 
vantage point from which to assess both the Berle–Dodd debate and 
Dodd’s other contributions to corporation law scholarship. My 
observations in this regard, however, must wait for another day. 
                                                     
 78. Elson & Goossen, supra note 11, at 736. 
